LiDAR

Exploiting contextual anomalies to detect perception attacks on cyber-physical systems

Zhongyuan Hau

Abstract

Perception is a key component in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) where information is collected by sensors and processed for decision-making. Perception attacks have been crafted specifically to subvert the CPS decision-making process. CPS are used in many safety-critical applications and perception attacks could lead to catastrophic consequences. Hence, there is a need to study how effective detection systems can be designed to detect such attacks. Designing detection systems for perception attacks in CPS is difficult as each CPS is domain-specific and existing detection systems for one CPS in one domain cannot be easily transferred to another. Current proposed detection systems are implemented to mitigate specific attacks and most offer only high-level insights on how the detection is performed. A systematic approach to designing detection for perception attacks that is generally applicable for CPS is needed. We propose a threat-modelling based methodology to design perception attack detection systems for CPS. An information model of the CPS, together with a threat model are used to determine how information correlations, defined as invariants, can be exploited as context for detecting anomalies. The proposed methodology was first applied to design perception attack detection Autonomous Driving, where we tackle the problem of attacks on LiDAR-based perception to spoof and hide objects. A novel specified physical invariant, the 3D shadow, was identified and shown that it is a robust verifier of genuine objects and was used to detect spoofed and hidden objects. Another learnt physical invariant of an object, where its motion needs to be temporally consistent, was shown to be effective in detecting object spoofing. Secondly, we apply the methodology to design the detection of false data injection in low-density sensor networks. We show that the use of learnt correlations across sensor measurements is effective even in a constrained setting with few sensors and heterogeneous data.

Shadow-Catcher: Looking Into Shadows to Detect Ghost Objects in Autonomous Vehicle 3D Sensing

Zhongyuan Hau, Soteris Demetriou, Luis Muñoz-González, Emil C. Lupu, Shadow-Catcher: Looking Into Shadows to Detect Ghost Objects in Autonomous Vehicle 3D Sensing, 26th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), 2021.

LiDAR-driven 3D sensing allows new generations of vehicles to achieve advanced levels of situation awareness. However, recent works have demonstrated that physical adversaries can spoof LiDAR return signals and deceive 3D object detectors to erroneously detect “ghost” objects. Existing defenses are either impractical or focus only on vehicles. Unfortunately, it is easier to spoof smaller objects such as pedestrians and cyclists, but harder to defend against and can have worse safety implications. To address this gap, we introduce Shadow-Catcher, a set of new techniques embodied in an end-to-end prototype to detect both large and small ghost object attacks on 3D detectors. We characterize a new semantically meaningful physical invariant (3D shadows) which Shadow-Catcher leverages for validating objects. Our evaluation on the KITTI dataset shows that Shadow-Catcher consistently achieves more than 94% accuracy in identifying anomalous shadows for vehicles, pedestrians, and cyclists, while it remains robust to a novel class of strong “invalidation” attacks targeting the defense system. Shadow-Catcher can achieve real-time detection, requiring only between 0.003s-0.021s on average to process an object in a 3D point cloud on commodity hardware and achieves a 2.17x speedup compared to prior work